Using Swedish administrative data and an event-study design, this paper studies the examine the impact of grandparenthood on retirement behaviour. For causal identification, I exploit conditionally random variation in the births of first grandchildren using an event study design. The effects of the arrival of the grandchild on retirement increase over time after the grandchild is born. The incremental effects are larger among grandparents in the upper half of the earnings distribution than among their counterparts.
This paper examines the effect of pension communication in the Swedish Premium Pension System (PPS) by exploiting the staggered roll-out of the Orange envelopes across different Swedish counties. Still, the letters’ economic relevance is limited due to low general engagement among the savers – however, those who respond to the letters by reallocating their portfolios benefit by having better portfolio performance and lower fees the upcoming years. Moreover, the effect is more prominent among active investors with higher cognitive abilities. These findings suggest that providing communication about pensions has smaller effects on less engaged individuals, and unresponsive investors are vulnerable to worse pension investments.
Using administrative data on individual PP fund choices matched with military enlistment intelligence test scores, we find that intelligence is strongly, negatively and almost linearly associated with investing in any of these companies. Intelligence is also strongly positively associated with the probability of divesting from these firms after, but not before, the fraud has been publicly revealed. Thus, intelligence protects against being financially victimized and it is people of low intelligence that suffer the most, which will translate into widening socioeconomic gaps in retirement along lines of intelligence.
How did investors in the Swedish Premium Pension System (PPS) react to the stock markets shock ignited in 2020 by the COVID-19 pandemic? The share of investors that traded more than doubled, and trades shifted capital from equity funds to low risk interest funds. In economic terms, however, trading activity stayed at very low levels—less than two percent of investors traded in March 2020 and there was no effect on pension withdrawals.
We show that, after the revelation of financial fraud in a major pension fund manager, two-thirds of affected investors fail to divest. Inert investors are on average younger, of lower SES and more influenced by default options. The majority of those who divest move their money to the only state-run option on the fund menu. The revelation of fraud also induces a small movement of investors from non-fraudulent private investment funds to the state alternative. Our results illustrate that fraudulent fund managers may exploit widespread consumer biases in choice-oriented pension plans, and that information interventions by the government are important but far from fully effective in nudging victimized investors to take the right action. Pension plans may be characterized by investor inertia even under extreme circumstances such as fraud.
This paper analyses the causes of social exclusion. It specifically explores the reasons why an individual experiences social exclusion today on the assumption that this may lead to similar experiences in the future. Results show that economic social exclusion is still very large and highly persistent over time. Results show that, social exclusion in Tanzania is relatively high. Results suggest that social exclusion dynamics in Tanzania is to a large extent triggered by observed characteristics (economic adversities) as compared to unobserved heterogeneity. These results can help to formulate and improve policies which are directed toward poverty reduction and social exclusion.